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ABSTRACT

The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in In re Bilski presents an opportunity to lay
to rest the patent eligibility of tax strategies. A comparison of the core values of the
patent and tax systems reveals fundamental conflicts that have gained the attention
of tax practitioners, bar associations and Congress. These conflicts are identified by
tracing both the development of patentable subject matter and the policy goals of the
tax system. This article addresses the future of tax strategy patents in light of In re
Bilski and analyzes the potential for the Court to deliver guidance that makes clear
the ineligibility of tax strategies as patent subject matter.
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Is BILSKLIKELY THE FINAL WORD ON TAx STRATEGY PATENTS?
COHERENCE MATTERS
LINDA M. BEALE *

Two decades ago, patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office ("Patent Office") primarily dealt with routine industrial manufacturing
processes and tangible machines.' The Federal Circuit's landmark 1998 decision in
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature FinancialGroup, Inc.2 found a method for
processing data to manage mutual funds through a "hub and spoke" system to be
statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.3 The State Street decision appeared
to remove any doubt that there ever was an exception to patentable subject matter
for business methods that do not involve traditional industrial inventions: methods
of conducting business can be patentable processes, the court held, so long as they
produce a "useful, concrete and tangible result." 4 The case revolutionized the types of
claims before the Patent Office, resulting in an avalanche of business method and
5
financial transaction applications moving through the system.
Software patents became commonplace. There are numerous patents held by
critical businesses operating in the internet world, such as Amazon's system for
purchases of books with a single click,6 Google's link analysis algorithm for ranking
web pages, 7 and Priceline's reverse auction procedure for allowing customers to set
their own price for travel purchases.8 Financial business method patents surged.9

* Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies, Wayne State University Law School. I
am particularly grateful for comments from Peter Yu and the participants at the Drake-Tundra IP
Conference, at which an earlier version of this paper was presented.
1 Richard S. Gruner, When Worlds Collide: Tax PlanningMethod PatentsMeet Tax Practice,
MakingAttorneys the Latest PatentInfringers,2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 33, 41 (2008).
2 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated byIn re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en
banc), cert.grantedsub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
3 Id.at 1375; see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
4 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en
banc)).
5 See John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method PatentMyth, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 987, 990-91 (2003) (noting the existence of"software-embodied" business method patents
before State Street and the surge of business method patents after the decision); see also Linda M.
Beale, Tax Shelters and the Tax Minimization Norm: How Does the Patenting of Tax Advice
Transform the (Global)Playing Field,J.L. Soc'y, Summer 2008, at 29, 32 [hereinafter Beale, Tax
Shelters] (noting complaints of an "increasingly impenetrable 'patent thicket' of complicated, vague
and overlapping claims") (quoting Peter Haapaniemi, Have We Lost Our Way, , IP Bus.,
Spring/Summer 2006, at 4).
6 Method and System for Placing a Purchase Order Via a Communications Network, U.S.
Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997) (issued Sept. 28, 1999).
7 Amended & Restated License Agreement, Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ.Google Inc., Oct. 13, 2003 (on file with The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law);
Method for Node Ranking in a Linked Database, U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 (filed Jan. 9, 1998)
(issued Sept. 4, 2001).
8 Purchase & Intercompany Services Agreement, Walker Asset Mgmt. LP-Walker Digital
Corp.-Priceline.com LLC-PricelineTravel, Inc., Apr. 6, 1998 (on file with The John Marshall Review
of Intellectual Property Law); Method & Apparatus for a Cryptographically Assisted Network
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Much to the surprise of most tax attorneys, patents were even granted on a number
of tax planning strategies. 1°
This explosion of business method patents-in
particular, the granting of patents on applications derived from the positive law, such
as tax strategy patents-engendered a growing controversy over the nature of the
patent system itself within the tax bar, the Patent Office, in Congress and in the
courts, reflecting disagreement about the proper role of patent law in an economy in
which services and financial transactions have taken on an increasingly significant
role."
Bar associations, accountancy groups and other tax practitioners have
generally viewed the development of tax strategy patents with alarm.12 The Patent
Office at first defended, and then questioned, the broad interpretation of patent
eligibility that permits patenting of ideas about how to structure a tax-savings
transaction. 13 Congress has wrestled with the question of whether it should
intervene in what can be patented with every new technology-man-made life forms
14
in the 1980s, software in the 1990s and business methods in the State Street case.
In the context of an ongoing consideration of major reforms to the law governing the
issuance of patents, Congress proposed an outright ban of patents on tax planning
strategies, though it has not yet enacted either a ban in isolation or as part of the
reform bill.15 The Federal Circuit, in the meantime, appeared to do an about-face
from its expansive State Street interpretation of the Patent Act's scope in a series of
opinions dealing with the patent-eligibility of business methods, including In re
Comiskey,16 in which the court affirmed the rejection of a patent for a process of
System Designed to Facilitate Buyer-Driven Conditional Purchase Offers, U.S. Patent No. 5,794,207
(filed Sept. 4, 1996) (issued Aug. 11, 1998).
9 Allison & Tiller, supra note 5, at 990-91; Douglas L. Price, Assessing the Patentabihtyof
FinancialServices and Products,3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 141, 141-42, 153 (2004).
10Linda M. Beale, Tax Patents:At the Crossroadsof Tax and Patent Law, 2008 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH & POL'Y 107, 107 n.3 [hereinafter Beale, Crossroads] (citing the ABA Section of Taxation Task
Force on Patenting of Tax Strategies, Lists and Examples of Tax Patents and Published
Applications, TAXATION, http://www.abanet.org/tax/patents/home.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2009)
(follow "Listing of Patents Classified as Tax Strategy Patents by PTO" hyperlink; and follow "Listing
of Published Tax Patent Applications Classified as Tax Strategy Patents by PTO" hyperlink)).
11 See id. at 107-15 (providing a brief overview of the development of business method and tax
strategy patents and the controversy around them); Gruner, supra note 1, at 33-40 (describing the
disagreement between the intellectual property and tax bars about tax strategy patents).
12 See Alison Bennett, Sowell Expects U.S. Patent Office to Issue Guidance Curbing Tax
Patents, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Jan. 23, 2008, at G8 (noting ABA concern over tax patents); Beale,
Tax Shelters,supra note 5, at 34-35, 35 n. 16 (referencing letters from various state bar associations,
the AICPA and other materials).
13 See Beale, Crossroads, supra note 10, at 115-16 (noting Patent Office's assertions, as
recently as May 2007, of the importance of issuing tax strategy patents); Bennett, supra note 12
(indicating that Sowell expects prohibitions on patents on "tax strategies that are not associated
with technology").
14 See, e.g., Stephen T. Schreiner & George Y. Wang, Discussions on Tax Patents Have Lost
Focus, IP LAW 360, July 13, 2006, at 1, http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl-s47Details%5CFileUpload
265%5C2423%5CTaxArticleIPLaw360_7-21-06.pdf.
15 See, Beale, Crossroads,supra note 10, at 116-19 (describing the patent reform initiatives);
see also Statement of Sen. CarlLevin on Introducingthe Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Mar. 2, 2009, available at 2009 TNT 45-32 (noting the inclusion in newly proposed tax
shelter legislation of section 303, which would prohibit any "tax planning invention" designed to
reduce tax liabilities).
16 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007), vacated, 89 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 13, 2009)
(en banc), amended by 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that the court acted en bane to vacate
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mandatory arbitration, and In re Nuijten,17 in which the court held that a transitory
propagating signal was too ephemeral to be patentable subject matter, and
culminating in In re Bilski,S in which the court essentially repudiated the State
Street test and set forth a new "machine or transformation" standard. 19
The business method patent revolution has now come to a critical point of
decision at the Supreme Court, based on the Court's grant of Bernard L. Bilski's and
Rand A Warsaw's petition for certiorari 20 from the adverse decision at the Federal
Circuit. This will be the first time that the Supreme Court has addressed the
breadth of patent subject matter scope in two decades. The Federal Circuit has been
struggling to reconcile and interpret for today's economy the law of nature/abstract
21
idea limitation on patentability set forth in the trilogy of Gottshalk v. Benson,
Parker v. Fook22 and Diamond v. Diehr,2 3 seminal Supreme Court subject matter
cases dealing with software that were handed down in the 1970s and early 1980s,
during the period before the information technology explosion had reached into the
fiber of everyday lives via the internet, cellphones, and laptop computers. 24 The
Bilski decision represents a sea change in the Federal Circuit's resolution of the
issues involved, making clear that the Court's conclusions will likely have a farreaching impact on patent law generally, and tax law in particular, even though the
25
Bilski case is not a platform that directly raises the tax planning patent issue.
In previous articles, I have argued that tax strategy patents should not be
permitted, based on a number of practice, institutional and policy concerns.2 6 This
article re-articulates and extends that analysis in the context of the Supreme Court's
acceptance of certiorariin Bilski. It proceeds in the following steps. Following this
general introduction, Part I briefly reviews the Constitutional and legislative context
in which tax strategy patents must be considered and the courts' shifting tests for
business method patents. Part II articulates a fundamental concept of tax law, the
anti-manipulation value, in its various manifestations, and demonstrates that
the original opinion and reassigned the opinion to the panel for revision and remanding the module
claims and means-plus-function claims requiring use of machines to the Patent Office to consider
the subject matter question on those claims).
17In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
18 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. grantedsub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735
(2009).
19Id. at 959-60.
20 Bilsk4 129 S. Ct. 2735.
21409 U.S. 63, 67, 71-72 (1972) (refusing to permit a patent claim for an algorithm for
converting binary coded decimals into pure decimals, because it would preempt the use of a
mathematical formula, which is a "basic tool[] of scientific and technological work," leaving "no
[unclaimed] substantial practical application").
22 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978) (holding unpatentable a method of using a computer algorithm
to establish an alarm limit in a catalytic conversion system).
23 450 U.S. at 192-93 (holding patent-eligible a claim applying a mathematical algorithm in an
industrial process to determine proper curing time in a device for curing rubber and thus narrowing
the "law of nature" exclusion in cases involving a concrete, practical application).
24 Joseph M. Barich, In re Bilski Recent Developments in Method Claiming,2009 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL'Y 251, 253 (2009) (noting the distinct change in technology since the Supreme Court
last addressed patentable subject matter).
25 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (No. 08-964), 2009
WL 226501.
26 See, e.g., Beale, Crossroads,supranote 10, at 112-13, 146-47.
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applying patent law to tax strategies flounders on three major fallacies-the
invention fallacy, the innovation incentives fallacy, and the public benefit fallacy.
Part III then considers whether the Bilski "machine or transformation" test is
sufficient to block inappropriate patenting of tax strategies.
This Part also
speculates about the potential for the Supreme Court, in its review of Bllski to
strengthen the patent-eligibility test in a way that acknowledges the problematic
nature of tax strategy patents. Part IV concludes.

I. PATENTS GENERALLY
A. The PatentRight
Patents are property rights granted to inventors by the government through the
27
agency of the Patent Office.

1. Constitutionaland Legislative Provisions
The Founders were aware of the potential abuses of the patent right, harking
back to the British Statute of Monopolies and the disdain for the royal prerogative to
grant burdensome monopolies in respect of everyday necessities. 28 The Founders
thus set the patent grant "securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive
Right to their ... Discoveries" in the context of a limiting preamble that authorized
Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 29 The first patent
legislation was enacted in 1790, when Congress provided for the granting of a patent
to any person who "hath or have invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture,
engine, machine, or device ....
The last major revision was the Patent Act of
1952.31 When inventors file an application, Patent Office examiners decide whether
the invention merits patent protection under the requirements set out by the Patent
32
Act.
The basic requirements are misleadingly straightforward. The patent must fall
within one of the four categories of patentable subject matter set by the statute: that
is, the patent must claim a new and useful process, machine, manufacture or
"30

27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to give inventors exclusive rights
to their discoveries for a limited time); 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2006) (granting the United States Patent
and Trademark Office the responsibility of issuing patents); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (defining the
rights of a patent holder as "the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention throughout the United States.").
28 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. grantedsub nom. Bilski v.
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
30 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10 (repealed 1793) (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 101). Equivalent language is also present in later Patent Acts. See, e.g., Patent Act of
1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318-20 (repealed 1836) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 101); Patent Act of
1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (repealed 1952) (same).
31 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 101, 66 Stat. 792, 797 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 101); 35
U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (tracing revision history).
32 35 U.S.C. § 131.
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composition of matter. 33 Our focus here, of course, is on patentable processes. A
process is defined under the statute as a "process, art or method." 34 To be patentable,
a process must also be "useful," "novel" and "non-obvious" to a person having
ordinary skill in the art. 35 If the Patent Office allows a patent to issue, the owner
obtains what is essentially a monopoly right for a term of years to exclude others
from making, using or selling the invention without the owner's permission (such as,
upon paying a royalty for the right),36 so long as the owner informs the public how to
37
make and use the invention.

2. Policy Rationales
The United States economy (and, to a large extent, the world economy) is built
on the foundation of free-flowing enterprise whereby innovations flourish and bring
better solutions to the needs of daily life. Standard economic theory assumes that
competition forces providers to meet or improve upon the quality of similar products
or services offered by other providers. That ideal of free enterprise, however,
depends on a stable legal system that achieves an appropriate sharing of information
across the society, so that innovators can build on current knowledge to create new
products. 38 The core idea of patents is to create economic incentives that reinforce
and make possible this flow of information and innovation. 39 Thus, the concept
behind the grant of an exclusive property right is to encourage inventors to invent by
ensuring that they are able to enjoy the economic benefit of their inventions for a
40
limited period of time.
At the same time, there is a significant quid pro quo-the patent requirement
for disclosure of the specifics of the invention. 41 Disclosure is intended to accelerate
inventions that are socially useful and made available to the public, even by
encouraging additional useful innovations as competitors to the patent holder work

Id.
J3 § 101.
34 Id. § 100(b).
35Id. §§ 101-103

(establishing the utility, novelty, and non-obvious requirements,
respectively).
36Id. §§ 154(a)(1), 261, 271 (granting the right to exclude, granting the right of assignment,
and defining liability for infringement of patent, respectively). The term is ordinarily 20 years from
the date the patent was filed. Id. § 154(a)(2).
37 Id. § 112 ("The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same, and shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.").
38See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Patent Office Meets the Poison PiT Why Legal Methods
CannotBe Patented,20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 333, 338 (2007) ("Conventional economic theory predicts
that, without government intervention, a society will produce too little technological innovation.").
39See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to grant limited monopolies to

"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"); Schwartz, supra note 38, at 339 (describing the
required disclosure though patents as "foster[ing] impressive technological advancement").
40 See Schwartz, supranote 38, at 338 (stating exclusivity encourages innovation by permitting

a patentee to "recoup her research and development ("R&D") costs, and then turn a profit.").
4135 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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around the invention. 42 The economics of patents is thus a tradeoff-a monopoly
right that provides a financial incentive to inventors, in exchange for the public
benefit to be derived from the eventual availability of useful innovations that might
not otherwise have been developed so rapidly. 43 While innovation and its presumed
benefits are at the heart of the rationale for granting patent rights, there is no
requirement in patent law that the invention provide a net increase in societal
44
benefits (aside from whatever benefit there is through the disclosure quidpro quo).

B. Business Method Patents and the Shifting Tests for PatentEihbility
Because of the policy rationale of fostering innovation, intellectual property
experts tend to view patent law as vital to innovation across a wide spectrum of
activities, even though patents had been applied almost exclusively to physical
technologies (machines, chemical combinations, industrial manufacturing processes)
through most of the history of the patent system. 45 Technological changes over the
last two decades have "revolutionized the way people do business and the tools they
use." 46 Businesses-especially those that have global connections or use the internet
and other electronic commerce centrally in their operations-have developed
proprietary models for measuring risk, tracking order status, valuing assets, and
carrying out almost any function necessary to their business. 47
Competitive
pressures have led many of these businesses to seek protection for these proprietary
48
models at the Patent Office.
As a consequence, the Patent Office and courts are challenged to determine the
appropriate scope of patentability based on the scant guidance in the Patent Act and
precedents in case law, applied to a diverse range of claims across a spectrum of
industries, from pharmaceuticals to information technology, from medical diagnostics
to tax strategies. The difference among industries is significant. While few would
question the value of the financial incentive afforded by patent law to the
development of new drugs for medical treatment, because of the hefty investment
and long lead time that is needed to develop such products, 49 the spread of process
42 See Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(describing a competitor design-around to an existing patent as an important public benefit).
43 Kevin Emerson Collins, PropertizingThought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 357-58 (2007) (terming
the patent right a "bargain between an inventor and the public").
44See, e.g., Gruner, supra note 1, at 56 (citing AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d
1352, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 1999), in which the court acknowledged that the process achieved efficiency
in transferring payments from service users to service receivers, but did not address whether there
were net societal gains).
45 See Steven G. Steger, The Long and Winding Road to GreaterCertaintyin Software Patents,
14 CBA RECORD 46, 52 (2000) ("The attraction of patent protection results in greater research
investment, no matter what the field of technology."); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent
Law Technology-Specic, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1158-60 (2002) (summarizing the
evolution of patent protection from industrial specific arts to broader technologies).

46

Kevin M. Baird, Comment, Business Method Patents: Chaos at the USPTO or Business as

Usual, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 347, 347 (2001).
47Id. at

347.
Id.
49 See Kory D. Christensen, Recent Developments in the PatentReform Movement: Potential
48

Benefits and Unintended Consequences, in UNDERSTANDING PATENT REFORM IMPLICATIONS:
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patents to ordinary activities of business people in the conduct of their businesses is
worrisome. For example, medical process patents, such as the method-of-diagnosis
claim in Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. v. Laboratory Corporation of America
Holding,5 0 "threaten to complicate medical practice, increase costs, and restrict
access to therapeutic and diagnostic procedures."5 1 Opponents of the broad grant of
business method patents suggest that the patent law reference to "processes" has
been stretched far beyond Congressional intent, from the traditional industrial
processes to any form of transaction between parties. 5 2 Electronic processing further
complicates the analysis, with opponents claiming that computers are "nothing more
than a rapid non-inventive step for conducting activities that were otherwise
conducted in more rudimentary form before a computer or software application was
added."5 3 The differences in response of various industries to the expansion of
patents led Dan Burk and Mark Lemley to announce that "[t]he patent system is in
crisis" with two different patent systems, one serving the pharmaceutical industry
54
fairly well, and another creating havoc in the information technology industry.
Notably, they call on the courts to cure the crisis, by tailoring the patent rules on a
55
case-by-case basis to the needs of particular industries.
Business method patents are grants on methods of conducting business, rather
than on industrial processes.5 6 As the Patent Office itself has noted, business method
patents are not an entirely new genre: various patents on automated business data
processing were issued even before the twentieth century, including three method
and apparatus patents to the predecessor company of International Business
Machines (IBM) for tabulating and compiling statistical information.5 7 But these
8
process patents surged after the Diamond v. Dieh 5s
decision appeared to open the
door to patentability of processes based on algorithms, as long as there was some
machine or transformative process involved, 59 and similar cases in other areas such
LEADING LAWYERS ON DEFINING KEY ISSUES, INTERPRETING CURRENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION, AND
PROJECTING FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 107, 135 (Aspatore 2009), available at 2009 WL 535243 ("The
vast experimentation necessary to generate one market drug is grounded on the drug's patent
protection." (quoting Eric Williams, Comment, Patent Reform: The Pharmaceutical Industry

Prescriptionfor Post-GrantOpposition and Remedies, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 354, 374
(2008))).
50 370 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. dismissed, 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (upholding a
patent for diagnosing a vitamin deficiency based on observed blood levels of homocysteine).
51Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Medical-Process Patents-Monopolizing the
Delivery of Health Care, 355 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 2036, 2036 (Nov. 9, 2006).
52 See David N. Makous & Mina I. Hamilton, Patent Law Reform and the Future, in
UNDERSTANDING PATENT REFORM IMPLICATIONS: LEADING LAWYERS ON DEFINING KEY ISSUES,
INTERPRETING CURRENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION, AND PROJECTING FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 21, 25
(Aspatore 2009), available at 2009 WL 535236.

53 Id.
54

DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT
1 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2009).

55 Id. at 95-108.
56 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Mayer, J., dissenting), cert.
grantedsub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
57
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, A USPTO WHITE PAPER: AUTOMATED FINANCIAL OR
MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING METHODS (BUSINESS METHODS) 3 (2000) [hereinafter USPTO
WHITE PAPER], http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/index.html.
58 450 U.S. 175 (1981).

59 Id. at 191-93.
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60
as Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
in which the Supreme Court upheld a patent on a bio61
engineered microbe.

1. The Supreme Court's Statements Of Exclusions From Patentability
62
The Supreme Court has not, most lawyers would have said before In re Bilski4
63
The Benson -Flook-Diehrtrilogy64
spoken definitively on business method patents.
had, however, drawn on older case law to set out a broad but ill-defined area of nonpatentable subject matter. Benson held ineligible for patenting "[p]henomena of
nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual
concepts."6 5 Diehr varied the terms slightly but similarly recognized an exception to
patentability for fundamental principles: "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas" were unpatentable.66
The issue, of course, is what application of an abstract idea or fundamental
principle is sufficiently particularized so that it will permit patentability. Various
phrases or tests have been used by the courts (such as "complete preemption of the
field"),67 but the difficulty of the concept is highlighted in the contrast between
Benson and Diehr,each of which involved the patentability of a claim referencing a
mathematical algorithm. The Benson Court concluded that a process for converting
data in one format (binary coded decimal) to another format (pure binary) by means
of a computer-implemented algorithm was not patentable:
it involved no
transformative application but rather the abstract intellectual concepts and mental
processes that "are the basic tools of scientific and technological work."6 8 In contrast,
the Diehr Court found the use of an algorithm to control timing in the industrial
rubber curing process patentable, even though the algorithm itself was not
69
patentable, because it involved the transformation of an article.
The Federal Circuit, as the sole appellate court with jurisdiction over patent
cases, 70 has developed, and rejected, a variety of tests as proxies for these broad
categories of abstract ideas that are ineligible for patenting, as discussed in the
60

447 U.S. 303 (1980).
at 309-10, 318.
545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. grantedsub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735

61 Id.
62

(2009).
63 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, What Ifs and OtherAlternative IntellectualPropertyand
Cyberlaw Stories: What If There Were a Business Method Use Exemption to Patent Infringement?,
2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 245, 257 (2008) (noting that the Supreme Court has not directly addressed

the patentability of business methods).
64 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67-71 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588-96
(1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 181-93 (1981).
65 Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
66Diehr,450 U.S. at 185, 191-93.
67 See DieMr, 450 U.S. at 187 (indicating that respondent's "process admittedly employs a wellknown mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt use of that equation.") (emphasis
added).
68 Benson, 409 U.S. at 67, 71-72.
69 Diehr,450 U.S. at 184-85 (1981) ("Transformation and reduction of an article 'to a different
state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular
machines." (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70)).
70 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006).
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following sections. These tests, however, have not been particularly successful in
providing consistent guidance to the scope of the patent law.71

2. Freeman-Walter-Abele Test
The Freeman-Walter-Abele test derives from a trio of cases concerning software
patents. 72 In the Abele case, a claim to process data for a graphic display of
variances of data from average values was held ineligible, but a dependent claim was
patent-eligible because it involved the transformation of physical data (X-ray
attenuation data of bones) into a visual depiction. 73 The test considered whether the
claimed invention was nothing more than the algorithm itself and thus unpatentable
under the Benson -Flook-Diehrtrilogy, or whether it was applied to or limited by
74
physical elements or process steps that rendered it patentable.
The Federal Circuit eviscerated the physical element requirement of the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test in Alappat, in which it concluded that the use of a
general purpose computer was sufficient to render an algorithm patentable. 75 State
Street simply rejected the test as having little relevance to determining patent76
eligible subject matter.

3. State Street's "Concrete, Useful Or Tangible Result" Test
The Federal Circuit in State Street repudiated any "business method" exception
to statutory subject matter, 77 as well as the Freeman-Walter-Abeletest,78 to hold that
the invention of a mutual fund pricing system using an algorithm to apply the
partnership tax rules to calculate a daily share price for a "hub and spoke"
partnership structure was patentable. 79
The decision below had rejected
patentability, on the basis that the claimed invention was nothing more than a series
71 For a general discussion of patent eligibility under section 101, see 1 DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.01-1.03 (2008).
72 In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (setting forth a two-pronged test: (1)
"whether the claim directly or indirectly recites an 'algorithm;"' and (2) "whether in its entirely [the

claim] wholly preempts that algorithm."), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(en banc), cert. grantedsub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758,
767 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (adding the concept, from Benson and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), that
post-solution activity could not save an abstract claim that "is not applied in any manner to physical
elements or process steps"), abrogatedby In re Bilsk 545 F.3d 943; In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (emphasizing the need to relate the application of the algorithm to physical
elements or process steps), abrogatedby In re Bilsk4, 545 F.3d 943.
73 In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 907-09.
74 Id. at 905-07.
75 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding the computer a "specific
machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result"), abrogatedby In re Bilsk4, 545 F.3d 943.
76 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
abrogatedby In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v.
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
77 Id. at 1375 ("We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest.").
78 Id. at 1374.
79 Id. at 1373, 1375.
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80
of mathematical functions that could be done with calculator and a filing system.
The appellate court instead focused on the "practical utility" of the invention-it
produced a "useful, concrete and tangible result" by transforming data, through a
8
machine, to a final share price. '
State Street involved a "means plus function" claim;8 2 however, the decision was
extended shortly thereafter by AT&T Corp., in which the Federal Circuit held
patentable even non-machine-based process claims for using switching mechanisms
83
to record data for billing purposes.
A flurry of business method patents followed.8 4 The Patent Office issued its
"white paper" on business method patents shortly after the State Street decision,
asserting a long history of business method patents-at least on mechanical products
related to financial paper (e.g., a 1799 patent for detecting counterfeit notes; an 1815
patent for preventing counterfeiting; and an 1889 patent for the Hollerith manual
punch card machine for tabulating business data).85 As one commentator noted, the
decision "spark[ed] a new cottage industry for financial institutions. What was once
considered a secondary offering-a competitor taking another's major offering and
8 6
plagiarizing the structure-is now considered patent infringement by many firms."
Information technology patents surged.8 7 One might say the decision spurred an
avalanche of innovation, proving that the patent law had made it into the 21st
century.
It seemed a short step from State Street to the view that "pure" business
methods (without computer applications) covering engineered financial products and
tax strategies could be patented. ABA meetings suddenly had sessions on tax
patents where practitioners discussed everything from the ethical implications under
Circular 230 to the nitty-gritty of searching for existing patents on a tax planning
technique.8 8 The holder of a patent on a grantor trust "technology" involving stock
options ("the SOGRAT patent") actually undertook infringement litigation,8 9 and the

80 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 515 (D. Mass.
1996), rev'd, 149 F.3d 1368, abrogatedbyIn re Bilski 545 F.3d 943.
81 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1374-75.
82 Id.
at 1371-72 (finding the specific structure for performing the function in the
specification); see 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
83 AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns Mktg., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357-58, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999),
abrogated
by In re Bilsk4, 545 F.3d 943.
84
Allison & Tiller, supra note 5, at 990-91; Price, supra note 9, at 141-142, 153.
85 USPTO WHITE PAPER, supranote 57, at 3.
86 Scott J. Bornstein & Barry J. Schindler, A Look at the Past, Present and Future of Tax

Reform, in UNDERSTANDING PATENT REFORM IMPLICATIONS: LEADING LAWYERS ON DEFINING KEY
ISSUES, INTERPRETING CURRENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION, AND PROJECTING FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
51, 62 (Aspatore 2009), availableat 2009 WL 535238.
87 See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
88 See Beale, Crossroads,supra note 10, at 108-10 (describing the increasing foment at the
ABA Tax Section over tax strategy patents).
89 Establishing & Managing Grantor Retained Annuity Trust Funded By Nonqualified Stock
Options, U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999) (issued May 20, 2003). The patent holder
sued John Rowe, then CEO of Aetna Insurance Company, for infringement, Wealth Transfer Group
LLC v. Rowe, No. 3:06CV00024 (AWT) (D. Conn. Jan 6, 2006); but the case was settled for an
undisclosed sum. See Jack Cathey et al., Tax Patents Considered, J. ACCT. (July 2007),
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/jul2007/cathey.htm.
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tax world woke up to the intrusion of patent law into the rarefied world of complex
tax structured transactions and general tax minimization planning.

4. The "TechnologicalArts"Requirement
Much of the current explosion of "pure" business method patents, including tax
strategy patents, may be due to the short-lived (as far as precedential value)
Lundgren decision by the Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences (the "Board").90
The application claimed a method for compensating managers who accomplish stated
goals referencing comparison firms and included no mention of a computer or any
other device. 91 An initial Board review considered the claim patent-eligible as "a
practical application of shifting of physical assets to the manager;" but a
reconsideration at the examiner level again rejected the patent because it was merely
"an abstract idea which is not associated with or connected to any technological
art."9 2 As Judge Smith noted in dissent, "the term 'technological arts' should be
construed to mean nothing more than a threshold nexus to some field of technology to
fall within the constitutional mandate." 93 Nonetheless, the Board reversed, finding
that there was no "technological arts" requirement for patentability, and that a
"concrete, useful or tangible result" was sufficient, in itself, to satisfy the statutory
94
subject matter requirement.

90 Exparte Lundgren,

76 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1385, 1431-32 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 28, 2005).

91Id. at 1385-86.
92 Id. at 1386 n.1.
93 Id. at 1388 (Smith, J., dissenting). In a prescient dissent that foreshadowed both the coming
surge of "pure" business method patents and the need for further judicial action, Judge Smith
pointed out that the cases cited approvingly by the majority had "either specifically recited machines
or were clearly performed in an environment that was an accepted science or technology" and that
the result "opens the floodgate for patents on essentially any activity which can be pursued by
human beings." Id. at 1389.
94 Id. at 1387. The Board stated that no "technological arts" test was established by previous
cases, citing In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970)) (finding steps that include mental
processes can be patented if the process is "in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with
the Constitutional purpose"); In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 877-78 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (in a claim for a
method of computer translation between languages, stating that the claim is a method of operating
a machine which is in the technological arts, as required by Benson); and Ex parte Bowman, 61
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1669, 1671 (B.P.A.I. June 12, 2001) (in a non-precedential opinion, affirming
rejection of an application for a method of valuing intangible assets based on its failure to require
any technological arts, a constitutionally imposed limitation). For a generally supportive discussion
of the Lundgren decision, see John A. Squires & Thomas S. Biemer, Patent Law 101: Does a
Grudging Lundgren Panel Decision Mean that the USPTO is Finally Getting the Statutory Subject
Matter Question Right 46 IDEA 561, 561-62 (2006). The Lundgren Board is selective in the way it
quotes Toma--the Toma court clearly affirmed the technological arts requirement rather than
rejecting it as implied.
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5. Bilski's "MachineOr Transformation"Test
In late September 2007, the Federal Circuit in In re Comiskey9 5 re-imposed a
technological requirement in rejecting patentability for a method of mandatory
arbitration.9 6 The court appealed to the long-settled law that disembodied abstract
ideas are not patentable, 97 noting that "it is established that the application of
human intelligence to the solution of practical problems is not in and of itself
patentable."98 The decision thus directly challenged the interpretation of State
Street as providing a much broader view of patentability.

a. The Bilski opinion
The Bilski patent claim involved a method of hedging commodity transactions
through steps requiring first that a transaction be initiated between a commodity
provider and consumer, and then that an appropriate third party be identified so that
a second transaction can be initiated between the commodity provider and a market
participant with an offsetting risk position to the original counterparty. 99 The patent
examiner rejected the claim as dealing with patent-ineligible subject matter, and the
Board upheld the rejection. 10 0 After an initial argument before a three-judge panel at
the Federal Circuit level (just weeks after the Comiskey decision),101 the appellate
court sua sponte ordered an en bane hearing and requested briefing on a series of
questions addressing the appropriate standard for determining whether a process is
10 2
patent-eligible under the statute.

95499 F.3d. 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007), vacated,89 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 13, 2009)
(en banc), amended by 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
96 Id. at 1380-81. A case decided at the same time dealt primarily with manufactures rather
than processes but similarly refused to find patentability in disembodied claims. In re Nuitjen, 500
F.3d 1346, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting a claim for reducing signal distortions introduced by
inclusion of a 'watermark' and noting that the fact that the claim could be embodied by conventional
means did not make it patent-eligible).
97 In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1376 ("[A] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
right." (quoting LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852))).
98 Id. at 1379.
99 See Energy Risk Management Method, U.S. Patent Application No. 08/833,892 ("Bilski
Application").
100Exparte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364, at *1, 30 (B.P.A.J. Sept. 26, 2006), affd
sub nom. In re Bilski 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
101See In re Bilski, 264 Fed. App'x 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (oral argument heard on October 1,
2007); In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (decision issued on September 20, 2007).
102 In re Bilski 264 Fed. App'x at 897. The en banc order called for briefing on the following
questions:
1.
Whether claim 1 of the 08/833,892 patent application claims patent-eligible subject
matter under 35. U.S.C. § 101?
2.
What standard should govern in determining whether a process is patent-eligible
subject matter under section 101?
3.
Whether the claimed subject matter is not patent-eligible because it constitutes an
abstract idea or mental process; when does a claim that contains both mental and
physical steps create patent-eligible subject matter?
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Chief Judge Michel's opinion for the court, in a 12-9 decision, reiterated the
Benson -Fook-Diehrteaching on process patents that fundamental principles are
unpatentable, as illustrated in the rejection of the Comiskey claim for a system of
mandatory arbitration as merely setting forth unpatentable mental processes
dependent on human intelligence.10 3 Furthermore, the court said, Benson and Diehr
both relied on a machine-or-transformation ("M/T") test that was consistent with
early Supreme Court precedent: claims must either be tied to a particular machine or
transform a particular article to a different state or thing.10 4 Accordingly, the court
concluded that the M/T test should be treated as the "definitive test" for analyzing
10 5
process claims.
Although Bilski did not overrule State Street, it cast doubt on its reasoning,
engendering considerable uncertainty about the treatment of many business method
patents. 10 6 Understanding this M/T test, and its implications for business method
and tax strategy patents, is therefore essential. The court acknowledged the
difficulty of using a bright-line test to cover all potential innovative developments
that should be eligible for patenting, admitting that Benson had been "initially
equivocal in first putting forward this test."'107 Noting Dieis later description of the
test as "the clue" to patentability, 08 the Blski court apparently concluded that the
Supreme Court had come to view the test as more definitive over time. It is likely
the court was influenced by the history of shifting tests as proxies for understanding
what claims represented fundamental principles that were not patentable and its
view that the M/T test had not fallen short in dealing with process claims over the
two decades since Diehr.0 9 While "future developments in technology and the
sciences may present difficult challenges to the machine or transformation
test .... [a]t present .... we see no need for such a departure." 110 At the same time,
the court refused to impose a "categorical exclusion" applicable to all business

4.
5.

Whether a method or process must result in a physical transformation of an article
or be tied to a machine to be patent-eligible subject matter under section 101?
Whether it is appropriate to reconsider State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999), in this case and, if so,

whether those cases should be overruled in any respect?

Id.

In re Bilsk4, 545 F.3d at 952-55, 964-65.
Id. at 954.
105 Id. at 954-55, 960.
106 Id.
at 959-60 (concluding that the "'useful, concrete and tangible result' inquiry is
inadequate."); see id. at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (arguing that State Street should be overruled).
107 Id. (discussing the hedging in the case law); see also id. at n.11 (noting the United States
Supreme Court's use of the phrase the "clue" to describe the M/T test).
103
104

108Id. at 956.

109As suggested by one of the amicus briefs, one could consider there to be a rebuttable
presumption that the M/T test is the definitive approach to process patents. Under this view, some
new process might qualify in the future-e.g., using psychokinesis to vulcanize rubber or wash out a
stable-but such a process does not yet exist. See Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for
Advanced Study & Research on Intellectual Property of the University of Washington School of Law
for Hearing en banc Supporting Affirmance at 25, In re Bilsk4 264 Fed. App'x 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(No. 2007-1130), 2008 WL 1842264.
110 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert granted sub nom. Bilski v.
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
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method patents."' The court may well have thought that such a ban, unlike the
adoption of the M/T test as the proper articulation of subject matter eligibility, would
undercut the Court's approach of reserving flexibility for unexpected new
112
processes.
Because the Bllski claim is not tied to a machine, there is little discussion of the
machine prong of the test. Interestingly, in the section where the court sets out the
M/T test, however, it suggests that Benson was a difficult case: the algorithm
required operation on a digital computer (so one might have thought it would have
satisfied the "machine" prong of the test), but it was nonetheless ineligible subject
113
matter because the algorithm had no utility other than operating on a computer.
In critically important language for the understanding of the applicability of
Bilski to tax strategy patents, the court states that the "main aspect of the
114
:
transformation test ... is what sorts of things constitute 'articles'
Purported transformations or manipulations simply of public or private
legal obligations or relationships,business risks, or other such abstractions
cannot meet the test because they are not physical objects or substances,
115
and they are not representatives of physical objects or substances.
The court seems clearly to have in mind physical or chemical transformations that
would not include the kind of tax strategy patents, like the SOGRAT patent, that
have been the subject of so much controversy among tax practitioners. 116
The court suggests two limiting corollaries to the M/T test. First, a field-of-use
limitation is not sufficient to overcome the problem of preempting a fundamental
principle. 117 That is, attempting to limit the use of a formula to a particular
technological environment that is not essential to the claim would not be sufficient to
circumscribe a mental process claim and render it patentable. Second, nominal use
of a machine or transformation cannot transform an unpatentable claim based on a
fundamental principle into a patentable process:
"the recited machine or
transformation must not constitute mere 'insignificant postsolution activity."' 118 The
court also instructs on the proper approach to the subject matter analysis: subject
matter is considered separately from the other requirements for patentability
(whether a claim is novel or non-obvious is irrelevant to the subject matter inquiry)
and looks at the claim as a whole, not each step individually. 119

"I Id. at 960.
112 Id. at 960 n.23 (adhering instead to the principles set forth by the Supreme Court).
113 Id. at 955 n.9.
114 Id. at 962.
115 Id. at 963 (emphasis added).
116 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
117 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957.
118Id.
119

Id. at 958.
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b. The Dyk concurrence
In a concurring opinion, Judge Dyk expounds upon the constitutional
limitations.120 He traces the British crown's abuse of grants of monopoly rights and
the development of the Statute of Monopolies, which he considers to have been an
important guide to Congress on the appropriate scope of patents in its enactment of
the early patent legislation.121

c. The Mayer dissent
Judge Mayer minces no words in indicating that methods of structuring
commercial transactions merit no protection under the patent system, which "is
intended to protect and promote advances in science and technology." 122 Business
methods do not apply natural laws, but reflect innovative entrepreneurial activity. 123
Since business methods provide competitive advantages, they do not need the
innovation incentive that underlies patent granting. 2 4 Their costs are much smaller
than the costs of scientific advances, and their rewards are grossly disproportionate.
Often the public suffers, rather than benefiting, due to increased costs passed on in
prices.
Affording patent protection to business methods lacks constitutional
and statutory support, serves to hinder rather than promote innovation and
usurps that which rightfully belongs in the public domain. 125

d. The Rader dissent
Judge Rader is similarly frustrated with the majority's failure to announce a
simple "abstractness rule"-the only limits on patentability are inventions that
embrace natural laws and abstract ideas.126 Hedging is a fundamental economic
practice that is facially abstract. 127 Accordingly, Rader suggests that the court
should have resolved the entire case with a single sentence: "Because Bilski claims
1 28
merely an abstract idea, this court affirms the Board's rejection."

120

Id. at 966 (Dyk, J., concurring).

Id. at 966-76 (noting that current law derives from the 1793 and 1790 acts, which built on a
"keen understanding of English patent practice," especially the limits on subject matter related to
the Crown's abuses and the passing of the Statute of Monopolies).
122 Id. at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 1003.
124 Id. at 1005.
125 Id. at 998.
126 Id. at 1012-13 (Rader, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 1013.
128 Id. at 1011 (accusing the majority of residing in the Stone Age because it "links patent
eligibility to the age of iron and steel at a time of subatomic particles and terabytes.").
121
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e. The Newman dissent
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Judge Newman sees the court as failing to
tie its interpretation of the Patent Act to the new "knowledge economy" and the
innovations that have been instrumental in "economic growth and societal change,"
resulting in reduced innovation incentives and upsetting of "settled expectations"
under the pre-Blski interpretations of the law.12 9 Judge Newman argues that the
court's "exclusion of process inventions is contrary to statute, contrary to precedent,
and a negation of the constitutional mandate." 130 She condemns Judge Dyk's reliance
on English patent law to limit the scope of patentable processes, and raises the
specter of uncertainty in interpreting the "meaningful limits" corollary or whether
software for a general purpose computer can be considered "tied to a particular
machine." 131 These are undoubtedly the same questions that tax practitioners have
as they ponder whether Blski will effectively ban all tax strategy patents that are
not, at the least, written as machine-dependent claims (means plus function). 132

II. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONFLICT BETWEEN TAx AND PATENT LAW
Tax practitioners have a number of concerns about patents on tax strategies, but
many of them are perhaps provincial concerns about our own increased burdens of
practice-worry that our field of activity will be taken over by patent lawyers, worry
133
that we will lose revenues because of the new expense for patent royalties.
Practice that focuses on deferred compensation plans, estate taxes, deferred real
estate exchanges-areas where there are a number of patents-now means
conducting at least some due diligence to discover whether the tax strategy under
consideration has been captured by a patent.134 Any area of tax may be faced with
new ethical considerations, as even the licensing agreements for patented tax
strategies may come under the Treasury's rules for practice before the Internal
Revenue Service. 135 Those concerns are real, but they are the kind of concerns that
129

Id.at 976-77 (Newman, J., dissenting).

Id. at 976.
Id. at 984-89, 994.
132 See id. at 994.
133 See, e.g., Steve Seidenberg, Crisis Pending:Can a patent on a legalstrategypreventa chent
from takingyour advice? The courts may soon decide, 93 A.B.A. J. 42, May 2007, at 42, 42, 46-47;
Bernard Wolfman, PatentingTax Strategies,2008 TAXES 39, 40 (same); Paul Devinsky et al., Whose
Tax Law-s It., LEGALTIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, http://www.legaltimes.com (same).
134 See, e.g., Dennis I. Belcher & Dana G. Fitzsimons Jr., Tax Planners-Bewareof Patented
Estate Planning Techniques, PROBATE & PROPERTY, Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 24, 27 (listing concerns of
providing tax advice when faced with potential infringement issues).
135 See Jeremiah Coder, PractitionersDiscuss Intersection of Tax Patents, Ethics, 117 TAX
NOTES 114, 114 (2007). I first raised this concern at the 2007 annual meeting of the Tax Section of
130

131

the American Bar Association and again at the 2007 fall meeting, based on the fact that many
applications do (and licensing agreements implementing granted patents under those applications
could be expected to) make direct statements about the federal income tax consequences of engaging
in a transaction. ABA TAX SECTION ANNuAL MEETING: ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE PANEL 2-8
(2007); cf U.S. Patent No. 6,292,788, Methods and Investment Instruments for Performing TaxDeferred Real Estate Exchanges (filed Dec. 3, 1998) (issued Sept. 18, 2001) (creating financial
instruments that "are eligible for tax-deferred treatment under .sctn.1031 of the Internal Revenue
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any changing profession must face. The more worrisome issues are ones that run to
the heart of the formative policies of the tax system, which are discussed in this Part.
In an earlier article, I discussed the specific concerns in considerable detail and will
136
not reiterate the full panoply of problems inherent in tax strategy patents here.
My goal here is to highlight the concerns that derive from core tax values and show
how those conflict with core values in the patent law.

A. The Tax Anti-Manipulation Value
In my scholarship, I have attempted to delineate the ways that traditional tax
policy goals impose limitations in different contexts, such as the intersection of tax
and financial reporting rules or the development of hyper-literal textual
interpretations to justify participation in shelter transactions intended to generate
artificial losses to reduce tax liabilities. 137 No matter what the context, two tax policy
concerns-fairness and structural coherence-are centrally important in determining
the proper approach. 138 Those same concerns are important in considering the
interrelationship between the patent law and tax law. 139

1. FairnessAnd The Anti-Manipulation Value
The objective of a tax system is to raise revenues to support the government in a
way that will be acceptable to taxpayers and that will reinforce, rather than disrupt,
the democratic polity. Accordingly, tax law must satisfy the basic requirements of
distributive justice-it must allocate the tax burden in a way that those bearing the
burden can perceive as fair, and it must pay special regard to those who find
themselves vulnerable because of limited resources. Although there is significant
disagreement among tax scholars about the details of a fair tax system and even
about the major parameters that should describe it, most agree that fairness
concerns limit the demands that can be made on those in the lower income
distributions and permit more substantial demands on those in higher income

Code."), invalidated by Fort Props, Inc. v. Am. Master Lease, LLC, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (C.D.
Cal. 2009) (stating that claims "only transform or manipulate legal ownership interests in real
estate.").
136 See Beale, Crossroads,supra note 10, at 129-46 (highlighting substantial commentary by
both academics and practitioners about the harms from patenting of tax strategies).
137 This section is an expansion of my earlier work on fairness and the anti-manipulation norm.
See Linda M. Beale, Book-Tax Conformity and the Corporate Tax Shelter Debate: Assessing the
ProposedSection 475Mark-to-MarketSafe Harbor,24 VA. TAX REV. 301, 303-06 (2004) [hereinafter
Beale, Book-Tax Conformity]; see also Linda M. Beale, Congress Fiddles While Middle America
Burns: Amending the AMT (andRegular Tax), 6 FLA. TAX REV. 811, 818-25 (2004) (discussing the
traditional concepts of horizontal and vertical equity and the Musgrave-Kaplow exchange).
138 See infra Part II.A. 1-2.
139 See infra Part II.B. 1-3.
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distributions. 140 This consensus is based upon the relative ability of each group to
bear the burden. 141
A corollary of this fairness criterion is a need to treat taxpayers consistently.
Persons who are similarly vulnerable should be similarly protected from paying too
large a share of the tax burden. Persons who are similarly advantaged with
resources should face similar demands to pay. Stated more broadly, consistent
treatment of taxpayers that are similarly situated creates a "minimal benchmark for
a distributively just system by favoring tax provisions that do not add to inequality
among taxpayers." 142 In addition, distributive justice is enhanced by "[p]rogressive
measures (such as the progressive rate structure in the federal income tax)" that
increase the tax burden on those with greater resources. 143 This redistributive value
helps sustain democratic institutions, where unequal power and status attributable
to unequal wealth can destabilize consensual decision-making by providing special
access to government actors. 144 The demand for consistency and redistribution places
substantial value on a tax law in which no one is in a position to manipulate the
numbers to avoid or lessen their tax burden. To honor the anti-manipulation value,
for example, high-income taxpayers should not have the ability to hide their assets to
avoid taxation (e.g., by moving assets offshore in complicated trust arrangements
that make it hard to trace the assets to the owners) and they should not be able to
enter into complex transactions that purport to reduce their tax burden without
having reduced their economic burden (e.g., by creating an artificial loss to offset
their tax liabilities).

2. StructuralCoherence And The Anti-Manipulation Value
Structural coherence is a statutory construction doctrine that embues the tax
system with integrity as a means of enforcing consistent interpretations across the
spectrum of interested parties and provisions, in light of discoverable overarching
principles. 145 As a normative concept, structural coherence expects that Congress
will draft tax provisions with the whole Code in mind-i.e., that each provision will
be set within a proper context so that it will add functionally to the coherence of the
Code. (There are exceptions, of course, as when Congress chooses to enact exceptions
or tax expenditure provisions that cannot be integrated into a coherent whole.)
Taxpayers and their advisers are likewise expected to approach their understanding
of the requirements of the tax law from a position of seeking structural coherence.
Tax concepts are interpreted in terms of their place within the full body of tax law,
and have meanings that are specific to that context. 146 Interpretations of tax
provisions in application to a particular context are anchored in the underlying
140 Id. at 359-61; Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontaland Vertical Equity: The
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993) (noting that vertical equity demands "an
'appropriate' pattern of differentiation among unequals.").
141 Beale, Book-Tax Conformity, supranote 137, at 359-61.
142 Id. at 359.
143

Id. at 359-60.

144
145

Id. at 360.
Id. at 364-65 (introducing the concept of structural coherence).

146

Id.
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purposes and presumptions of those provisions and of the Code in general. 14 7
Accordingly, "both textualist interpretations of tax rules that focus on plain meaning
without regard to the place of a provision in the overall tax structure and
freewheeling interpretations based on a particular judge's approach disregard
structure coherence."' 148
That mutual demand for coherence establishes the
appropriate scope for tax enforcement: tax administrators should pursue taxpayers
who have filed returns based on aggressive interpretations of Code provisions that
distort the application of the tax system to their particular situation to achieve a tax
advantage.
It should be readily demonstrable that the anti-manipulation value underlies
the coherence-reinforcing interpretive approach just as it does the fairness criterion.
The tax system cannot achieve structural coherence if taxpayers "game the
system."'149
Taxpayers who intentionally pursue aggressive, hyper-literal
interpretations of a provision by taking it out of context of the underlying purposes
for which it was enacted have engaged in a manipulation of the positive law for their
own benefit that violates the demand for a search for structural coherence. Tax
advisers who design structures to capture loopholes in the coverage of tax provisions
that exist because Congress had not foreseen the kind of transactions or activities
that the tax adviser is arranging are guilty of manipulating the tax law for their
clients' benefit.

B. Three Fallacies
The anti-manipulation value permits us to highlight two fallacies about the
applicability of patent law to tax planning in the context of a democratic polity:, the
innovation incentives fallacy, 150 and the public benefit fallacy.1 51 A third fallacy, the
invention fallacy, 152 follows from adopting a similar structurally coherent approach to
the patent law.

1. The Innovation Incentives Fallacy
The primary argument for an expansive view of patent-eligible subject matter is
the innovation incentive.1 53 The spread of patent law to the full panoply of human
endeavors is cast as an inherent good whereby the patent law monopoly right

147
148

Id.
Id.

149 Id. at 367 ("A tax system cannot be structurally coherent if the subsystems within it can be
gamed or combined in unintended ways to avoid tax liability.").
150 See infra Part JJ.B.1.
151 See infra Part JJ.B.2.
152 See infra Part JJ.B.3.
153 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(noting that the United States Supreme Court has consistently confirmed patentable -eligible subject
matter as "providing a broadly applicable incentive to commerce and creativity"), cert. granted sub
nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
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provides necessary economic encouragement to invention in every sphere. 15 4 This is,
quite simply, evidence of an innovation incentives fallacy.
Tax advisers are pushed-by real demands of business to reach into new areas,
by clients who want to do that at the least tax cost, by reputational competitiveness,
and by their own personal ambitions-to develop innovative tax structures. In fact,
innovation in tax avoidance techniques is the bread and butter of the prestigious tax
bar.
The pendulum actually swings far too one-sidedly towards tax minimization
innovations. Tax lawyers tend to take reducing the tax burden as a mandate, and
the litigation-oriented ethical requirement of "zealous advocacy" as permission or
again as a mandate to develop innovative tax transactions that aggressively apply
tax law provisions to garner tax savings. The corporate tax shelter surge throughout
the 1990s provides ample evidence that there is no lack of innovation (or incentives
55
to innovate) among tax advisers. 1
The addition of patent incentives directly undermines the tax anti-manipulation
value by encouraging innovation in tax planning that results in a distortion of the tax
rules, inconsistent application of the rules to similarly situated taxpayers,
inappropriate pressures on tax attorneys to aggressively pursue shelter design, and
significant revenue loss to the Treasury. Patents on tax planning add one more
incentive that pushes the tax bar to analyze the tax law for loopholes, now in search
not only of a particular way to structure a particular business transaction for a
particular client, but for a "cookie-cutter deal" that can be put on the shelf to grab a
share of what would otherwise have gone to tax revenues for royalty fees. Tax
patents thus conflict directly with the developing set of rules to curb tax
manipulation by demanding broader information reporting and penalizing promotion
156
of shelter deals.
Patents on tax-structured transactions are simply not the same as, say, patents
on seat belts, even though both types of patents have an impact on the ability of
individuals using the patented product to comply with the law. Seat belts, for
example, are frequently required by law because legislators have concluded that
riders simply cannot ride safely without seat belts in today's car-hog world. 157 That
positive law context, however, is irrelevant to their patentability-the law is neither
a component of the seat belt innovation, nor relevant to the utility of the device. If a
new model belt with distinctive features is slightly less safe than other existing
154 See, e.g., Robert A. Meyers, Standards-An Important Patent Portfolio Licensing
Opportunity, in ADVANCED LICENSING AGREEMENTS 2009, 335, 335 (PLI 2009) ("[S]ociety benefits
tremendously when inventors are well rewarded by a system in which inventions are publicized
through the exclusionary right awarded by a patent."); Gruner, supra note 1, at 53-57 (setting out
three reasons why objections to tax innovation are "misguided"-tax reduction, assistance to
taxpayers in tax avoidance, and patent rewards for economic transfers without increased social
utility); see also E. Anthony Figg, Keeping Currentwith the Chair: Should the PatentLaws Exempt
Certain Innovation from PatentEligibity?,IPL NEWSL., Summer 2006, at 3 (arguing that the focus
should be on "incentive for innovation, investment, and prompt disclosure of new ideas").
155 Beale, Book-Tax Conformity, supra note 137, at 351-54 (describing the reduction in
effective tax rates for corporations due to use of tax shelters and alternative minimum tax system
strategies).
156 Id. at 303-04 (noting efforts to penalize tax shelters and broaden disclosure requirements).
157 See, e.g., 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-603.1 (2008) (requiring driver and passenger to use
safety belts in the state of Illinois).
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models but more convenient to use (and therefore more likely to be used regularly)
because it exploits a new attaching device, it may be patentable. 158 It will be up to
users to make the choice between added safety or added convenience, or up to
jurisdictions to disallow models that do not satisfy a minimum safety standard.
Either way, however, the development has actually furthered the purpose of the seat
belt law (providing additional devices that satisfy a minimal standard of improving
safety). 59 Similarly, if a new model belt is many times better than the old, it will be
patentable even if there is no practical choice other than paying for the new or riding
unsafely. The public is disadvantaged by the cost of the choice but benefited on
balance by the added safety. 60 In both the convenient and safer innovations, the
patent law's innovation incentive serves the purpose of the seat belt requirement in
161
the first place-saving lives.
With tax strategy patents, it is just the opposite. The tax law is directly
relevant, as a component of the way the tax-advantaged transaction or financial
instrument functions.1 62 The existence of the patented tax planning strategy does
not further the tax law with which it is connected, such as by incentivizing
compliance with provisions or informing the public about the way the tax laws work
so that they will be able to apply the law appropriately. 163 Rather, it directly
contravenes the tax law by establishing a way to manipulate provisions to serve taxavoidance objectives that may conflict directly with the underlying congressional
purpose. The public at large is not served by tax avoidance innovation, since it

158 See id. (indicating that producing the best product, in this case the safest, is not a
requirement to obtain a patent).
159See, e.g., 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-603 (requiring sellers of motor vehicles to provide
seatbelts, meeting Department established specifications).
160

Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 10-11, (U.S. 1966) ("[T]he underlying

policy of the patent system [is] that 'the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of
an exclusive patent,' . . . must outweigh the restrictive effect of the limited patent monopoly."
(quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac M'Pherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in VI THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: BEING HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS,
MESSAGES, ADDRESES AND OTHER WRITINGS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE, 1790-1826 181
(H. A. Washington ed., 1859))).
161 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to grant limited monopolies to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,"); 83d Gen. Assem., H. Deb., at 211-12 (II. 1984)
(statement of Representative John Cullerton) (stating that the use of seat belts will save lives).
162 The State Street patent, for example, directly references the partnership allocation
regulations under I.R.C.§ 704. Data Processing System for Hub & Spoke Financial Services
Configuration, U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 col.2 1.3-11, 34-47 (filed Mar. 11, 1991) (issued Mar. 9,
1993). Similarly, the patent application for a like-kind exchange directly references I.R.C. § 1031,
the Code provision providing non-recognition. Methods and Investment Instruments for Performing
Tax-Deferred Real Estate Exchanges, U.S. Patent No. 6,292,788 (filed Dec. 3, 1998) (issued Sept.
18, 2001).
163 The statements here may not apply to tax return preparation software or other types of
software that "translates" tax law into a more comprehensible and applicable format that can take
taxpayer data and make determinations about compliance with clearly understood provisions of the
law. The former perhaps should be patentable, if other similar compliance software is patentable.
See, e.g., Fully-Automated System for Tax Reporting, Payment & Refund, U.S. Patent No. 6,202,052
(filed May 7, 1998) (issued Mar. 13, 2001). The latter may fall short under the public benefit fallacy,
since they are patents that restrict taxpayers from following required law without paying a royalty
to a private party. See infra Part II.B.2.
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reduces monies going into the fisc by sidetracking them to the pockets of patent
holders. Such innovation directly challenges the anti-manipulation value.

2. The PubhlicBenefit Fallacy
Patent law recognizes only one axis for measuring the social utility of the patent
process-the quid pro quo benefit of disclosure as an aid to use of innovations and
acceleration of workarounds to patented innovations. 164 In contrast, the public
benefits of the tax laws are a defining feature-taxation without adequate
institutional justification creates dissent and discord. This inherent conflict between
the way patent and tax law systems are justified is the basis for the public benefit
fallacy.
The institutional concerns arising out of the patenting of tax planning methods
are many. 165 Perhaps most important is the potential for patent trolls to monopolize
areas of the laws, directly thwarting Congressional intent in setting economic, social
and fiscal policy and damaging the coherence of the tax system. 166 Any newly
enacted tax provision may be relevant to many types of transactions, but Congress
may have enacted the provision with a particular use in mind. Enactments may spur
the proverbial "race to the patent office" for related transactions, leading to a few
major players holding key patents over large areas of the law. Congressional
intent-whether it be to raise taxes and discourage certain conduct or to lower taxes
to stimulate the economy-will be thwarted, and a portion of the taxes intended for
the fisc, or the benefit intended for the taxpayer, will be redirected to the benefit of
the patent holder. 167 This use of patents to turn a general purpose law into a rentproducing provision on behalf of the patent holder runs afoul of the antimanipulation value and could end up discouraging compliance.
Moreover, the possibility of filing for a patent on a tax planning method will
likely negatively impact professional relationships among tax attorneys, accountants
and government officials. 168 These groups work together collectively through bar
associations and other venues to develop better understandings of the tax rules and
the potential structural gaps where coherence falters. Tax patents will deter public
dialogue among tax professionals, thus constraining even further the flow of
information already impeded by trade secrets, and limiting the collective
development of structurally coherent theories. 169 Worse, tax patents will add to the
competitive pressures on tax professionals that already embellish the tax

164 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); see Schwartz, supra note 38, at 338 (stating exclusivity encourages
innovation by permitting a patentee to "recoup her research and development ("R&D") costs, and
then turn a profit.").
165 For a view of the many institutional issues, both domestic and global, that arise because of
the patenting of tax advice, see Beale, Crossroads,supra note 10, at 138-44.
166 Id. at 138.
167 Id.
168 See id. at 141-43.
169

Id. at 143.
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minimization norm. 170 That, too, will press against coherent interpretations, as tax
professionals strive to create a name for themselves as innovators who can
successfully patent ideas for structuring tax-advantaged deals.'71 Innovations in tax
do not serve the public good, and these pressures on the tax bar directly conflict with
the anti-manipulation value underlying the tax laws.
Finally, tax patents directly counter the anti-manipulation value, by providing
direct incentives to tax advisers to develop ways to provide particularized tax
treatment to their licensees. Differential access to advice about complying with the
tax laws already exists, to be sure, but it is not based on a monopoly grant to
particular individuals and it is not absolute. Patents, in contrast, are governmentgranted property rights that permit holders to license or not, as they see fit.172 If a
patent holder does not make a tax planning strategy available, and that strategy is
the only way to engage in a particular type of transaction in a tax-efficient way, the
grant of the patent collides head on with the anti-manipulation value, resulting in
loss of respect for the system.
The failure of patent law to take into account the impact that issuance of a
patent may have on institutional, professional and justice concerns means that the
public benefit of disclosure promised by the patent bargain is shallow indeed when
measured against the core values that are lost on the granting of tax planning
method patents.

3. The Invention Fallacy
The innovation fallacy argues that the patent emphasis on encouraging
innovation in new fields is overdrawn-indeed, our current financial crisis and
economic recession arose in large part because of the overwrought ability of financial
institutions to engineer financial products like credit default swaps, proprietary
valuation models determining value at risk, and other tools that allowed them to
conduct business as though systemic risk had been relegated to the past. At the
least, the merit of innovation in tax-where similar economic incentives push
practitioners to aggressively challenge the limits of textual provisions by devising
new loopholes to shelter taxes-is highly questionable and directly challenges the
anti-manipulation value at the heart of fairness and structural coherence
considerations.
But beyond the issue of utility of innovation in tax planning techniques, the
question arises whether the type of innovation that is represented by tax patent
claims-elaboration of new methods to do a business transaction that harnesses the
tax code for tax benefits (e.g., the method for carrying out a section 1031 like-kind
170 See id. at 144 (arguing tax advisors already compete on their ability to deliver tax
minimization strategies and that the availability of patents creates a "lopsided emphasis on
planning at the cost of the tax system.").
171Id. at 143 (noting that due to the new pressures to innovate, firms will be less likely to call
into question their individual interpretations of the code).
172 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to give inventors exclusive
rights to their discoveries for a limited time); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (defining the rights of a
patent holder as the "right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States.").
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exchange with deedshares that was invalided in Fort Properties,Inc. v. American
Master Lease, LLC'173 or a new method of implementing the calculations required by
the tax code (e.g., the partnership allocation rules harnessed in State Street)-should
even be considered "inventions" under the Constitution and Patent Act. 174 The
Supreme Court spoke directly to this issue in respect of "laws of nature" when it
decided Parker v.Flook 175 in 1978:
The rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot be patented rests,
not on the notion that natural phenomena are not processes, but rather on
the more fundamental understanding that they are not the kind of
76
'discoveries' that the statute was enacted to protect. 1
The positive law enacted by human legislatures, of course, is not "discovered" since it
is published and available for all to find. 177 Although the elaboration of a "new"
interpretation of particular provisions of positive law as they may apply to a
particular human undertaking might be considered "discoveries," in a broad sense,
they should be treated on a par with the discovery of a law of nature as something
not within the patent statute.
In a recent article, Andrew Schwartz arrived at the same conclusion by
considering the patent law from the perspective of seeking structural coherence as a
means of determining the scope of statutory provisions. 178 He outlines a strong
argument that legal methods, such as tax planning methods, cannot be considered
encompassed within the patent law because the patent law is restricted to
"inventions,"'179 which by its terms are innovations that harness the laws of nature to
specific, useful ends. 180 First, the patent law actually disregards all positive law
other than the patent law itself-an invention, if within the scope of the patent law's
eligibility requirements, can be patented whether or not it is legal under other
positive law. 181 Because tax strategies harness the positive tax laws to determine the
structure of transactions designed to achieve tax savings, they cannot then also claim
the benefit of the patent law.18 2 Second, legal methods do not benefit from the
173 609 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
174 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Mayer, J., dissenting), cert,

granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. 2009) ("The patent system is intended to
protect and promote advances in science and technology, not ideas about how to structure
commercial transactions.").
175 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
176

Id. at 593.

177 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (2006); see Flook, 437 U.S. at 593.
178 Compare Schwartz, supra note 38, at 355-57 (tracing a consistent definition of invention

internationally and historically), with Beale, Book-Tax Conformity, supra note 137, at 364 (arguing
for interpretation of tax rules in view of the overall structure of the tax system). Schwartz, of
course, did not describe his approach to interpretation of the patent law as a structural coherence
hermeneutics, but I would argue that structural coherence is the underlying rationale for each of his
conclusions about patentability of legal methods.
179Schwartz, supra note 38, at 357-58.
180Id. at 356 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
181Id. at 358.
182 Id. at 366 (arguing that patent law protects inventions that "utilize or harness a law of
nature for human benefit, and thus excludes from its scope legal methods which, by definition,
utilize or harness positive law.").
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disclosure quid pro quo of the patent grant, because legal methods are uncertain
until they have been publicly approved by the appropriate regulator or a court. 183
Accordingly, legal methods are not inventions, and are not patentable, simply
because the patent law cannot take account of the structural elements-legal
obligations and relationships-out of which they are built and a patent grant cannot
8 4
provide the quid pro quo at the heart of the patent bargain.

III. Is BILSKiA

SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION

It is clear that the anti-manipulation value is at odds with both the patent
purpose (encouraging innovation) and the presumed patent benefit (making
inventions available more quickly to the public). Moreover, the consistent observance
in Supreme Court cases of a demarcation between patentable inventions and
unpatentable abstractions suggests that the Court would not view tax strategy
planning steps as patentable inventions.
This is reinforced by the inherent
contradiction between the utter disregard for positive law reflected in the irrelevance
of illegality to the patentability of a claim and the necessity of treating a positive law
185
claim as the patentable process itself if tax strategies are indeed patentable.
Accordingly, a coherent interpretation of the patent statute, along the lines of the
coherent-reinforcing approach to tax law interpretation discussed in Part II, requires
that the patent grant not be interpreted to extend to tax strategy patents.

A. Uncertaintiesin the Application of the Bilski M/T Test to Tax StrategyPatents
If the Bilski M/T test survives Supreme Court review, will it be sufficiently
vigorous to result in a ban on tax strategy patents? This Part addresses two areas of
concern-the machine-prong workaround, and the apparent tangibility criterion.

1. The CategorizationProblem And The Machine -ProngWorkaround
The transformation prong of the M/T test, at least as phrased by the Bilski
court, does not appear to permit most (perhaps all) tax strategy patents.18 6 Most tax
strategy patents deal with determinations of amounts of payments or allocations of
income from one party to another or with the structuring of transactions. 8 7 There is
no physical matter to be transformed, or representation of physical matter, other
183

Id. at 371.

184

Id.

185 See Schwartz, supranote 38, at 365.
186 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en bane), cert.grantedsub nom. Bilski

v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (citing Gottshalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)) ("The machine-ortransformation test is a two-branched inquiry; an applicant may show that a process claim satisfies
§ 101 either by showing that his claim is tied to a particular machine, or by showing that his claim
transforms an article.").
187 See, e.g., Establishing & Managing Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts Funded By
Nonqualified Stock Options, U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999) (issued May 20, 2003).
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than the physical transformation that takes place with any human activity. 8 8 The
Bilski statement that purported transformations of legal obligations or relationships
cannot satisfy the M/T test seems to definitively leave tax strategy patents off the
table. 8 9 That language strikes a resonant chord with many who view the State
Street decision as having given "process" an overbroad meaning applicable to almost
any form of human transaction or interaction. 190
But how does that caveat regarding the unpatentability of legal relationships
interact with the possibility of "applying" fundamental principles in a machine? The
lack of clarity about the machine prong is significant. 191 The technological change
represented by the use of computers as a "means" for process claims may present
"nothing more than a rapid non-inventive step for conducting activities that were
otherwise conducted in more rudimentary form before a computer or software
application was added."'192 And the patent bar's response in the immediate period
after the Bi]lski decision suggested that workarounds would be fairly simple-"as long
193
as you add the words "on a computer" to a claim, then you're all good."
Even though Bllski might be read to suggest that mere computerization of a tax
strategy may not be enough to convert an unpatentable mental process into a
patentable claim, 194 two Board decisions (decided prior to Bilski but after Comiskey)
seem to draw an untenable distinction on the machine prong. 195 In Langemyr, a
patent claim requiring mathematical manipulations of data on a single general
purpose computer was held ineligible subject matter. 196 Being tied to the use of a
computer (rather than slow human calculations) was not sufficient to make it
patentable. 197
This meshes with Blskis "insignificant post-solution activity"
corollary:
a general purpose computer, without more, is mere computer
implementation that cannot permute ineligible subject matter into a patentable
claim. 198 The second case, Ex parte Wasynezuk, involved a process claim that
188See Bilsk4 545 F.3d at 963 ("Purported transformations or manipulations simply of public
or private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet
the test because they are not physical objects or substances, and they are not representative of
physical objects or substances.").
189Id.
190See e.g., Makous & Hamilton, supra note 52, at 25 (describing processes as having been
"expanded into essentially any form of transaction").
191See In re Bilski 545 F.3d at 962 ("We leave to future cases the elaboration of the precise
contours of machine implementation, as well as the answers to particular questions, such as
whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular machine.").
192 Makous & Hamilton, supra note 52, at 25.
193Michael Masnick, Is There Still A Big Loophole For Software And Business Method
Patents, TECHDIRT, Oct. 31, 2008, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20081030/1647512692.shtml;
see In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding the computer a "specific machine
to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result"), abrogatedby In re Bilsk4, 545 F.3d 943.
194In re BiJsk4 545 F.3d at 952 ("Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of
scientific and technological work." (quoting Gottshalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972))).
195Exparte Langemyr, 89 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1988, 1997-98 (B.P.A.I. May 28, 2008); Exparte
Wasynczuk, 87 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1826, 1827-28 (B.P.A.J. June 2, 2008).
196ExparteLangemyr, 89 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1997-98.
197 Id. at 1998.
198In re Bilski 545 F.3d at 957 ("[Jlnsignificant post-solution activity will not transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process." (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92
(1981))).
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required the use of two computers with different operating languages, acting in
series on a set of data. 199 The Board acknowledged that the claims were merely
creating mathematical representations of physical systems. 200 The mere fact that
two separate physical computing devices were necessary was treated as establishing
a process that was tied to a particular apparatus, not simply a generic computing
20 1
device for performing the steps. The claim therefore was eligible subject matter.
Accordingly, the ability of patent applicants to tie tax planning to particularized
machines becomes important: Comiskey acknowledges the difficulty of determining
whether a process is tied to an apparatus or whether the apparatus is merely a
nominal recitation, and that difficulty leads the panel in its amended opinion to send
the "module" claims back to the Patent Office for consideration of the potential
patentability based on use of a machine.20 2 Yet Ex parte Cornea-Hasegan,a nonprecedential Board decision after Bilski, relied on the Blski "insignificant postsolution activity" and "meaningful limits" limitations to reject a claim for performing
20 3
mathematical computations that required the use of a general purpose processor.
The Blski caveats about insignificant post-solution activity therefore suggest these
patents would not be easy to achieve, but they might be feasible. Patent attorneys
appear to view the machine prong as the primary workaround to any potential Bilski
restriction, as evidenced by continuing emphasis that claimants should "disclose (and
claim) interaction with a computer in every patent application that is not a pure
mechanical device."2 0 4 And the efficacy of a test is only as good as the examiners that
20 5
apply it to the individual patent applications.

2. The Apparent Tangibility CriterionAnd The UncertaintyRegardingSoftware
As commentators have noted, the Bilski court's various allusions to physical
objects or physical steps is difficult to analyze and hard to justify normatively. 20 6 The
199Exparte Wasynczuk, 87 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1827-28.
200 Id. at 1833.
201 Id. at 1833-34.
202

554 F.3d 967, 979-80 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing post-solution activity).

The court noted

that the module claims may require the use of a machine "under the broadest reasonable
interpretation." Id. at 981.

ExparteCornea-Hasegan, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1557, 1559-61 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 13, 2009).
Dennis Crouch, In re Ferguson (Answers to FrequentlyAsked Questions FAQ), PATENTLY0, (Apr. 15, 2009, 11:51 CST) (on file with The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law)
(discussing a profit-sharing arrangement whereby a shared marketing force received some of the
profit from software developed by an inventor in return for marketing and support); accord In re
Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. 2009)) (distinguishing the
claims at issue in State Street, which tied a method to a computer, and in Bilski which failed to
satisfy the "machine" element of the machine-or-transformation test).
203

204

205 See C. Alan Fu, Annual Re view of Law and Technology: I IntellectualProperty: B. Patent.'
1. Prosecution History Estoppe: Festo Corp. v.Shoketsu i'nzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 18

BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 132 (2003).
206 See

MJ Edwards & Donald Steinberg, The Implications of Bilski: Patentable Subject

Matter in the United States, 49 IDEA 411, 426 (2009) ("[P]atentability arguments relying on
'physical steps' present in the claims are uncertain under Bilski."); Kevin Collins, An Initial
Comment on In re Bilski" Tangibility Gone Meta, PATENTLY-O, Nov. 1, 2008, at 3 (on file with the
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court suggests that a transformation must either act on a physical object or present a
representation of a physical object, and ties that to its statement regarding the
inappropriateness of granting patents for "purported transformations" of "legal
obligations or relationships." 20 7 Data representing a physical object are eligible
subject matter (visual depiction of X-ray attenuation data of bones), but data
representing intangible information is not (a process of graphically displaying
variances in data from average values), because the former is a transformation of
"raw data into a particular visual depiction of a physical object," even though there
20 8
has been no transformation of the underlying physical object itself.
At the same time, the court goes out of its way to address what it calls "a
possible misunderstanding" about its Comiskey decision discussion of physical
steps. 20 9 Physical steps may not be sufficient to satisfy the test. 210 At the same time,
a claim without physical steps may be appropriately tied to a machine or achieve a
transformation so as to satisfy the test.211 Nonetheless, "a claimed process wherein
allof the process steps may be performed entirely in the human mind is obviously not
tied to any machine and does not transform any article into a different state or thing.
212
As a result, it would not be patent-eligible."
This distinction raises further questions for tax-related patents. Many tax
practitioners, even some who object strenuously to tax planning patents for reasons
similar to those I have set forth in Part II, think it is reasonable for patents to be
offered on programs that provide tax computational assistance-e.g., programs like
TurboTax that permit individual taxpayers to enter data so that the program can
compute the application of the tax laws to the data and generate appropriate return
information. But most of us do not think that Goldman Sachs should be able to
patent a new version of a contingent liability tax shelter generating artificial losses
to reduce clients' tax liabilities. 213 Tax software may satisfy the machine prong of the
patent eligibility requirements, although it appears that tax software could suffer
from the fate of not being tied to anything other than a general purpose computer
unless it is claimed with a specific instrument-say, a hand-held device for
John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law) (asserting that BilskIs transformation test
makes arguably unsustainable distinctions between physical and intangible data with the result
that both the process and the type of article that is transformed by the process must be considered
in determining patentability). Collins notes the lack of normative justification for distinguishing
between manipulation of physical data (bone structure) and manipulation of data on intangibles
(age, height, incomes, etc.). Collins, supra.
207 In re Bilski 545 F.3d at 963 ( "Purported transformations or manipulations simply of public
or private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet
the test because they are not physical objects or substances and they are not representatives of
physical objects or substances.").
208 Id. ("So long as the claimed process is limited to a practical application of a fundamental
principle to transform specific data, and the claim is limited to a visual depiction that represents
specific physical objects or substances, there is no danger that the scope of the claim would wholly
pre-empt all uses of the principle.") (emphasis added).
209
210
211

Id. at 960.
Id. at 960-61.
Id. at 961.

Id. at 961 n.26 (emphasis added).
Id.; see, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255, 255 (Sept. 5, 2000) (identifying "Son of
Boss" shelters that inflate partnership basis as listed transactions for purposes of the reportable
transaction rules).
212
213
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calculating tax liability.2 14 The tax shelter, on the other hand, should not be
patentable under the machine prong of the test, even if it is designed to have steps
that run on a computer. The reason is that the determinations are ones that can be
made by any person with knowledge of the tax laws, by applying the tax laws
through mental processes to the applicable intangible data (corporate taxpayer,
individual taxpayer, income, expenses, losses, etc.). The tax shelter should also be
patent-ineligible under the transformation prong, under the explicit language
2 15
denying patentability to manipulations of legal obligations or relationships.
Furthermore, such tax shelters clearly would not satisfy this "tangibility criterion":
the data are either intangible data reflecting tax attributes (income, expenses, losses,
entity status) that are entered appropriately into an algorithm to produce the
corresponding tax liability, or they are structured transaction information that
resemble the Bilski claim itself (matching a transaction with a hedging transaction
and ensuring implementation between the appropriate counterparties).
Most tax practitioners, myself included, have beenconcerned that it would be
difficult to define a problematic tax strategy in ways that would contrast it with a
useful computer-implemented program for tax liability determinations. If Bilski
holds-and neither type of claim constitutes a transformation nor is tied to a
particular machine-then neither type is patent-eligible and the problem doesn't
arise. Our concern about tax strategy patents is resolved. But if it the Supreme
Court on appeal creates a more-nuanced test intended to ensure that software and
perhaps some business methods are patent-eligible, there will likely be ongoing
categorization problems for tax-related patents between useful computerization of
tax calculations and unpatentable steps for structuring tax transactions.

B. The Bilski Decision at the Supreme Court
Given the many political and technical difficulties in moving an appropriate
patent law reform through Congress, many commentators have asserted that the
courts are in fact the appropriate arbiters of patent doctrine from a "structural,
historical, and institutional perspective." 216 The state of patent law today is clearly
in flux: even after the Comiskey and Bilski decisions, there are still patent
applications under consideration for pure tax structuring techniques.2 17 It may be
that such flux is beneficial, as the common law system grapples with changing

214 See Ex parte Langemyr, 89 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1988, 1997-98 (B.P.A.J. May 28, 2008)
(finding mathematical manipulations of data on a single general purpose computer ineligible subject

matter).
215 Id. at 963.
216 Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law ofPatents 53 (Case Western Reserve
Univ. Sch. of Law Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 09-18, 2009),

available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1396679.
217 See, e.g., USPTO Publishes Patent Application for Method Enabling Native American
Tribal Investment, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 27, 2009, available at 2009 TNT 78-77 (claiming a
business method for deferring corporate income tax by using an LLC taxed as a partnership as a
pass-through entity allowing investment in tribal corporations). I was aware of this type of tax
shelter as early as 1998, when it was discussed among tax professionals.
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technology and needs. 218 But the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari suggests that
there will be a more definitive decision, one way or another, from that Court.
The outcome will be important for the tax system, and other industries, as
evidenced by the wide range of amicus curiae briefs-both for and against the Bilski
approach to patentability-at the en bane hearing of Blski and in support of the
Bilski petition for certiorari.219 For some, the patent system is a critical spark to
innovative developments, but for others, "patents seem more like a hindrance that
yields little benefit." 220 For tax, the inherent conflict between the goals of tax policy
and the goals of the patent system mean that there is clearly a strong detriment to
the patentability of tax planning methods. Blski represents an opportunity for the
Court to clarify the types of activities that are outside the scope of the patent law, but
the outcome is clearly uncertain.

1. Bilski Reversed-A Worrisome DevelopmentFor Tax Practice
The Supreme Court's recent foray into patent law suggests that it considers
bright-line tests inappropriately rigid and limiting. 221 If that logic is applied here, it
may be that the Court will simply reverse Bilski under a broader reading of the
patent law. It may choose to reinstate the extraordinarily broad State Street
patentability standard based on a worry about a gruesome parade of horribles if

218

See, e.g., John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "PrimePercolator"-A Prescriptionfor

Appellate Re view of Questions in PatentLaw, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 674, 716 (2009) (suggesting the
value of the Supreme Court acting as a disruptor, rather than settler, of the common law of patents
and that the Court should provide "general but malleable guidance"). But cf Brief of Amicus Curiae

Borland Software Corporation in Support of Petitioner at 5-6, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (en banc), cert. grantedsub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (No. 08-964), 2009 WL
585758 (urging the Supreme Court to clarify the law because of "seemingly perpetual inconsistencies
in the jurisprudence of patent eligibility").
219 See Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (listing more than thirty amicus briefs). Compare
e.g., Brief of Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3, In
re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct.
2735 (2009) (No. 08-964), 2009 WL 559338 [hereinafter Brief of Koninklijke] (arguing that Bilski "is

overreaching, works an unnecessary sea change in deep-rooted principles of patent law, and will
necessitate a massive revaluation of America's intangible technology assets."), with e.g., Brief of
Amici Curiae Consumers Union, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Public Knowledge for Hearing
En Banc at 4, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. grantedsub nom. Bilski v.

Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (No. 08-964), 2008 WL 1842260 ("[Giranting applications such as
Bilskis encourages rent-seeking on human thought and behavior.").
220 Donald L. Rhoads, Key Concepts in Patent Reform, in UNDERSTANDING PATENT REFORM
IMPLICATIONS: LEADING LAWYERS ON DEFINING KEY ISSUES, INTERPRETING CURRENT PROPOSED
LEGISLATION, AND PROJECTING FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 89, 90 (Aspatore 2009), available at 2009
WL 535241 (indicating that technology, electronics, and financial services companies may find their
businesses negatively impacted "by people who did not make a material contribution to the art").
Perhaps the two fields most interested in the outcome of Supreme Court review are software and
tax. Neither requires a particular machine nor transforms a particular article to a different state.

Id.
221 See Erika Arner, Ten Reasons the Supreme Court Should Take In re Bilski PATENTLY-O,
April 1, 2009, http.//www.innegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news-f4addOa8-8fV74475-9838-flaeO755baf4 cf KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. 550 U.S. 398, 419-20 (2007) (rejecting the
Federal Circuit's "teaching, suggestion or motivation" test for nonobviousness as too rigid).
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process patents are limited, as so many amici argued (i.e., the threat that software
companies will move offshore, financial innovation will grind to a halt, etc.).222 The
likely result would be a renewed race to the Patent Office for new (and old)
223
"inventions" in tax.
Reversal would raise the specter of all of the concerns outlined by the tax bar
over the years since State Street was decided as outlined in Part II, above and in my
earlier articles on this topic. In fact, if the Court gives its apparent blessing to a
broad view that any useful method of conducting human activities can be patented, it
is likely that there would be a surge not only in tax patents but also in patents on
other legal processes such as tort law or contract law. One could imagine patent
claims for strategies for arguing tort cases or steps for working through a contract
negotiation-materials that constitute the heart of many legal case books and
scholarly journal articles.
It is undoubtedly safe to predict, therefore, that a revival of the extraordinarily
broad State Street patentability standard would cause other doctrinal levers to come
into play to prohibit or, at the least, severely restrict the availability or power of tax
planning patents. The Treasury Department would surely continue its development
of the patented transaction provision in the reportable transaction regulations to
require reporting for patented tax planning. 224 Bills were already introduced in the
110th Congress in both the House and Senate to ban tax strategy patents, and other
bills would have provided a resolution by mimicking the medical procedure patent
restriction to limit remedies for tax strategy patent infringement. 225 Strengthened by
the wealth of discussion among tax professionals in response to State Street, Bilski
and the ongoing patenting of tax strategies, Supreme Court reinstatement of the
State Street test might well permit Congress to find the institutional wherewithal to

See Brief of Koninklijke, supra note 219, at 14.
Beale, Crossroads,supra note 10, at 139.
224 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, REG-129916-07 RIN 1545-BG76, 72 Fed. Reg. 54615,
5461 (Sept. 26, 2007) (proposing disclosure of "patented transactions" under the reportable
transaction regulations). See generally I.R.C. §§ 6011, 6111 (West 2008) (setting forth a regime
governing reporting and penalties in connection with potentially abusive tax shelters, along with
regulations promulgated thereunder); ABA Members Comment on New Reportable Transaction
Category for Patented Tax Strategies, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 22, 2007, available at 2007 TNT 3612 (commenting on the operation of disclosure rules for patented tax transactions). (The author
participated in drafting the ABA comments.)
225 See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 10 (2007) (making "tax
planning methods" unpatentable, but excepting tax preparation software or other methods of
preparing tax or information returns); Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 681, 110th Cong. § 303 (2007)
(including a ban on "tax shelter patents" that are "designed to minimize, avoid, defer, or otherwise
affect the liability for Federal, State, local, or foreign tax"). Similar "stop tax haven abuse"
legislation including a tax planning patent ban has been introduced in the 111th Congress in both
Houses. See H.R. 1265, 111th Cong. § 303 (2009) (making tax planning inventions unpatentable,
but excepting "tax preparation software and other tools or systems used solely to prepare tax or
information returns"); S. 506, 111th Cong. § 303 (2009) (same). Various organizations have provided
commentary urging Congress to take action on the patenting of tax strategies. See, e.g., AICPA
Supports Tax Strategy Patent Amendment Added to Patent Reform Bil, 87 THE CPA LETTER 9,
Sept. 2007, at 1, available athttp://www.aicpa.org/download/cpaltr/2007-09/septO7.pdf.
222
223
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enact a free-standing ban on tax strategy patents or to move the ban through the
larger patent reform effort.226
If Congress does step in to ban tax strategy patents, it may ban the patenting of
any tax planning method in a straightforward provision that would be easily
enforceable. It may, however, limit the ban to tax strategies that constitute tax
avoidance shelters or permit tax return preparation software patents but not other
machine-implemented tax planning patents. 227 In the latter case, the categorization
problem will remain. Just as the Internal Revenue Service and Congress have
struggled to articulate the judicial doctrine of economic substance applied to define
illicit tax shelters in a way that distinguishes them from acceptable tax minimization
strategies in determining tax liability for particular taxpayers, it will be difficult for
the Patent Office to distinguish between the banned problematic tax strategies and
228
the permitted useful computerization of tax information to assist tax planners.

2. Bilski Affirmed-An Invitation To Clever PatentAttorneys
If one considers the Supreme Court's actions in recent patent cases dealing with
other areas of the patent law, it might be more reasonable to assume that the Court
has agreed to review Bilski in order to make it clear that the State Street decision,
with its implication of patent-favorable handling of almost any claimed step-by-step
process to accomplish a useful end, went too far. 229 The Court had hinted, as early as
its Benson decision, that Congress should take action on the patentability question
regarding intangible innovations. 230 Perhaps because Congress has not acted, recent
Court opinions have "weakened patentees" and appeared "to reign in the Federal
Circuit on patent-favorability." 231 Accordingly, a likely outcome at the Supreme
226 The formation of a broad coalition of consumer organizations, financial planners, and
groups concerned with taxpayer rights has increased pressure for Congress to act. The coalition has
written key members of the House of Representatives to urge passage of a tax patent ban on the
grounds that it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will decide the Bilski case in a way that will
prevent further issuance of tax strategy patents, thus requiring a legislative solution. See Letter

from Barry Melancon, President and Chief Executive Officer, American Institute of Certified Public

Accountants, et al. to Representative John Conyers, Jr., et al. (Oct. 20, 2009) (on file with The John
Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law) (supporting passage of the Boucher-Goodlatte bill,
H.R. 2584).
227 See, e.g., S. 506, 111th Cong. § 303; H.R. 1265, 111th Cong. § 303 (making tax planning
inventions unpatentable, but excepting "tax preparation software and other tools or systems used
solely to prepare tax or information returns.").
228 See S. 506, 111th Cong. § 303 (listing multiple exceptions to a proposed ban of tax method
patents).
229 See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419-20 (2007) (rejecting the Federal
Circuit's "teaching, suggestion or motivation" test for nonobviousness as too rigid).
230 Gottshalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 73 (1972) ("[Clonsidered action by the Congress is
needed.").
231 Michael Guntersdorfer, The Death of State Streetg 9 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 61,
73 (2009) (discussing KSR and eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), among
others); see also Ben Hattenbach, The Changing Face of Patent Law: Globalization Meets
Legislative and Judicial Activism, in UNDERSTANDING PATENT REFORM IMPLICATIONS: LEADING
LAWYERS ON DEFINING KEY ISSUES, INTERPRETING CURRENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION, AND

PROJECTING FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 35, 47 (Aspatore 2009), available at 2009 WL 535237
(indicating that the Court had "reawakened from a long dormancy").
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Court is an affirmation of the Federal Circuit's M/T test, or at the least, an indication
that there should be a strong presumption in favor of that test, a position argued by
amicus curiae Software & Information Industry Association at the Federal Circuit.232
That result would radically change the debate on patentable subject matter for
tax strategy patents (and many business method patents) and would bring about a
systemic change in the kinds of processes that can be patented. The Bllski court
categorically rejected the technological arts test because of its presumed
ambiguity.2 33 After all, some amici indicated that financial engineering and
2 34
economically based claims are technological fields similar to other applied sciences,
while others made clear that only science and mathematics-based inventions could be
considered technological arts.2 35 Yet the test announced by the Bilski court does look
very much like a technological arts test-especially the language about transforming
2 36
physical objects or representations of physical objects.
Under the M/T test, business method patents generally would be much harder to
attain, and software patents would perhaps be generally unavailable. 237 The M/T
test will likely make it much more difficult for patents to issue on tax planning
methods that set forth the human activities that must be undertaken to structure a
transaction or create a legally valid financial instrument. The Court's affirmation of
the M/T test would therefore be supportive of the tax anti-manipulation value.
Will clever drafting circumvent this apparent line on patentable subject matter?
As Judge Mayer noted in his dissent, clever drafting can transform "nearly every
process claim .. to include a physical transformation," such as the inclusion of a
meter to record consumption for Bilski's hedging transactions.2 38 One can assume
that large companies that have had patents in information technology and similar
fields, like Philips Electronics, will attempt nonetheless to develop workarounds for
239
their patent needs.
232 Brief of Amicus Curiae Software & Information Industry Association in Support of Neither
Party and Affirmance of the Decision Below at 3, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir, 2008) (en
banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. 2009) (No. 08-964), 2008 WL
1842262.
233 Id. at 960.
234 See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in
Support of Appellee at 11, 24, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert.grantedsub
nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. 2009) (No. 08-964), 2008 WL 1842274.
235 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp. in Support of
Neither Party at 11, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom.
Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. 2009) (No. 08-964), 2008 WL 1842284.
236 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
237 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Death of Google's Patents PATENTLY-O, July 21, 2008, at 2
(on file with The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law) (indicating that Google's
PageRank patent might be invalid under the M/T test).
238 In re Bilsk4, 545 F.3d at 1008 (Mayer, J., dissenting). At some level, every human activity
involves a physical transformation: time passes, energy is consumed, and those who engage in a
transaction go from a state of not being in a particular transaction to a state of being participants in
the transaction. See id. The language about legal relationships in In re Bilskiis clearly intended to
indicated that the statute does not encompass these types of physical transformations, but the
possibility of describing even human mental activity in such terms makes clear the difficulty in
drawing lines for process patents.
239 See Brief of Koninklijke, supra note 219, at 3 (arguing that Bilski "is overreaching, works
an unnecessary sea change in deep-rooted principles of patent law, and will necessitate a massive
revaluation of America's intangible technology assets.").
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This expectation of circumvention by clever drafting, however, seems somewhat
of a stretch. The Bilski court's "field of use limitation" and Diehfs language that
ineligibility "cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to
a particular technological environment" explicitly reject attempts to tie a claim
nominally to a technological field. 240 Similarly, the insufficient post-solution activity
limitation goes to this point. 241 Token use of technology or nominal limitations
intended to gain patentability should not to be respected by the Patent Office or
courts. Furthermore, for many tax planning method patents, it may be harder to
invent appropriate physical transformations that could be implemented or to limit
the claim to a machine. Dollar flows (whether income or outgo) need not be
measured on a physical meter, since most financial transactions are conducted
electronically. Unless the actual physical activity that is undertaken to enter into a
structured transaction is taken into account, it appears that it would be hard to come
within the physical transformation prong. Merely adding a general processor to
accumulate data or apply a mathematical algorithm would appear to invoke the post2 42
solution activity limitation.
The lack of clarity about the machine implementation prong of the test, however,
will leave the tax bar in uncertainty about the potential for tax planning method
patents based on means-plus drafting to require machines and the patent bar busy
attempting to work around the limitation.

3. Bilski Modified-A ParadigmShift
Given the thirty years of experience since its opinions in the Benson-Fook-Diehr
trilogy, the Court may concede the lack of any need to retain flexibility for new
technologies (like psychokinesis) and adopt the M/T test with its supporting
corollaries as the appropriate method for determining patentability of process
claims. 243 Assuming that the surge of legal method and other new types of patents
have captured its attention, it may also be ready to provide further guidance on
drawing the appropriate line between excluded subject matter and patentable subject

240

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 599

(1978)).
241 In re Bilsk4, 545 F.3d at 957 n.14 (discussing In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (holding that a simple recordation step in the middle of a claimed process incapable of
imparting patent eligibility)).
242 Id. at 957 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981)) ("Insignificant postsolution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process."). On
August 24, 2009, the Patent Office issued interim examination instructions for evaluating subject
matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in view of In re Bilski. Those guidelines explicitly provide
that simple recitation of a computer to carry out a process will be insufficient if there are no steps
implemented on the computer to make it a special purpose computer and reiterate the "meaningful
limit" and "insignificant extra-solution activity" corollaries set forth in the Bilski decision. Interim
Examination Instructions for Evaluating Subject Matter Eligibility under 35 U.S.C. §101. (August
24, 2009) (distributed by Andrew H. Hirshfield, Acting Deputy Commissioner for Patent
Examination Policy), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/2009-08-25_
interim 101 instructions.pdf.
243 See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the psychokinesis example in the
Wasying School of Law amicus briee.
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matter. The Bilski case presents an ideal platform for an expansive opinion tying
together the Court's precedential decisions on mental processes, abstract ideas, and
the Constitutional limitation to the "useful Arts."
Ideally, the Court will step up to that stage in recognition of the invention
fallacy for claims like Bilski's and in doing so deliver guidance that buttresses
arguments against patentability for tax planning methods.2 44 For example, it would
be reasonable for the Court to clarify that its statement that "anything under the sun
made by man" 245 is eligible to be patented was intended to address the technological
arts as historically understood and should not be read to encompass non-scientific
fields such as economics and finance. Further, the Court could-and shouldacknowledge the correctness of the Bilski court's treatment of legal obligations and
relationships as abstractions plainly ineligible for patenting. In that context, the
court could expand on the meaning of the traditional exclusion for mental processes
and abstract ideas to make clear that legal advice, such as the steps necessary to
undertake a tax-advantaged transaction structure, cannot be patented because it is
premised on utilizing positive law.
If the Court takes such an approach, it will achieve a significant paradigm shift
in the patent law. The subject matter expansion set in motion by the Federal
Circuit's State Street decision will come to a much deserved halt, and legal advice
will once again not be eligible for patenting. Innovation will not cease, but the
inappropriate rent-seeking from patents in areas of the law that have traditionally
been off-limits to the patent process will.

CONCLUSION

Patentability determinations have undergone considerable turmoil over the last
few decades as the Federal Circuit moved towards a looser standard for patentability.
The State Street decision let the gates down, creating a surge of patents in areas that
had never been considered eligible before, such as tax planning strategies. The
Federal Circuit's Bilski decision slowed this patent binge to a crawl, giving various
participants an opportunity to assess the long tradition of patents for technological
breakthroughs and the claims for patentability of "any thing under the sun made by
man."2 46 Tax and patents do not go well together, and Bilski provides an opportunity
to put the idea of legal method patents to rest once and for all. When the Supreme
Court hears the case, it may reverse Bilski and leave Congress no choice but to enact
legislative exclusions to the patent laws. It is likely, however, that it will instead
affirm Bilski and it may even announce new guidance that clarifies the
nonapplicability of patent law to legal methods. This article has explored the patent
law, and found the course leading to Bilski well supported in the Court's precedent.
Similarly, relying on the underlying goals of the tax system has demonstrated the
incompatibility between tax and patent law. Ultimately, both will be served best if

See supra Part II.B.3.
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong.
§ 5 (1952)).
246 See supra Part I.B.5.
244
245
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the Court takes this opportunity to restate the limitations of the patent law and
reinforce the understanding that legal relationships are not patentable.

